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Targeted Economic Sanctions in Light of the Hong
Kong Autonomy Act and U.S.-China Tensions
I. INTRODUCTION
Throughout the twenty-first century, the United States has
popularized the use of targeted economic sanctions to encourage foreign
governments and financial institutions to further U.S. foreign policy
goals.1 Compared to traditional sanctions, targeted sanctions intend to
limit humanitarian costs and third country impacts by holding individual
leaders and political elites accountable for intolerable or uncooperative
behaviors.2 Thus, as trade tensions with China have intensified over the
past few years, with China’s passing of The Law of the People’s Republic
of China on Safeguarding National Security in the Hong Kong Special
Administrative Region3 (“HKSAR Security Law”) on June 30, 2020, the
use of targeted sanctions was a natural response. 4
China’s
implementation of the HKSAR Security Law is seen as a direct violation5
of the 1985 Joint Declaration of the Government of the United Kingdom
1. See Elizabeth Rosenberg et al., The New Tools of Economic Warfare: Effects and
Effectiveness of Contemporary U.S. Financial Sanctions, CTR. FOR A NEW AM. SEC. 5 (2016),
https://www.cnas.org/publications/reports/the-new-tools-of-economic-warfare-effects-andeffectiveness-of-contemporary-u-s-financial-sanctions [https://perma.cc/5J3X-VGF6] (“The
United States has had a long history with economic coercion, and in the years since 9/11,
financial sanctions in particular have taken a prominent role in national security strategy.”).
2. Gary Clyde Hufbauer & Barbara Oegg, Targeted Sanctions: A Policy Alternative?,
PETERSON
INST.
FOR
INT’L
ECON.
(Feb.
23,
2000),
https://www.piie.com/commentary/speeches-papers/targeted-sanctions-policy-alternative
[https://perma.cc/CPQ2-GLG7] (noting that targeted measures can include arms embargoes,
travel bans, and asset freezes).
3. English Translation of the Law of the People's Republic of China on Safeguarding
National Security in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, XINHUANET (July 1,
2020, 12:50 AM), http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2020-07/01/c_139178753.htm
[https://perma.cc/H8FW-ZSTN] [hereinafter HKSAR Security Law].
4. See Karen Yeung, How the US Uses the Dollar Payments System to Impose Sanctions
on a Global Scale, S. CHINA MORNING POST (Aug. 25, 2020, 4:30 PM),
https://www.scmp.com/economy/china-economy/article/3098691/how-us-uses-dollarpayments-system-impose-sanctions-global [https://perma.cc/3733-QWYV] (republished on
Yahoo
Finance,
https://finance.yahoo.com/news/us-uses-dollar-payments-system093000191.html [https://perma.cc/9KY2-WSL6]) (discussing how the U.S. dollar’s
dominance has popularized the use of sanctions beginning with the Clinton administration).
5. SUSAN V. LAWRENCE & MICHAEL F. MARTIN, CONG. RES. SERV., R46473, CHINA’S
NATIONAL SECURITY LAW FOR HONG KONG: ISSUES FOR CONGRESS 1 (2020) (referring to
China’s Security Law as a violation of the Joint Declaration).
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of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and The Government of the
People’s Republic of China on the Question of Hong Kong (“Joint
Declaration”). 6 China is using the HKSAR Security Law to unify China.7
Further, the HKSAR Security law ends the “one country, two systems”8
policy that has governed China’s relationship with Hong Kong.9 To
leaders in the U.S., China’s action is an erosion of Hong Kong’s
democratic autonomy.10 In response to the HKSAR Security Law, the
U.S. passed the Hong Kong Autonomy Act (“HKAA”) on July 14,
2020.11

6. Joint Declaration of the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and
Northern Ireland and The Government of the People’s Republic of China on the Question of
Hong Kong, UK-China, Dec. 19, 1984, 1399 U.N.T.S. 33 [hereinafter The Joint Declaration].
The Joint Declaration is a legally binding treaty signed between the United Kingdom and
China in 1985 and registered with the U.N. that was part of a planned transition of Hong
Kong’s sovereignty from the UK to China. LOUISE BROOK-HOLLAND, HOUSE OF COMMONS
LIBR., No. 08616, HONG KONG: THE JOINT DECLARATION 2 (2019) (UK). The Joint Declaration
declared China would “resume the exercise of sovereignty over Hong Kong with effect from
1 July 1997.” The Joint Declaration, supra, at 61.
7. The area which is modern day Hong Kong was “ceded to Great Britain” under
agreements between Great Britain and China after the First and Second Opium Wars (1842
and 1860 respectively). LOUISE BROOK-HOLLAND, HOUSE OF COMMONS LIBR., supra note 6.
Great Britain obtained Hong Kong in 1898 on a ninety-nine-year lease and ruled over Hong
Kong until 1997, when the 1984 Sino-British Joint Declaration went into effect. Id.
8. The “one country, two systems” policy is the implicitly derived key term of the 1984
Sino-British Joint Declaration. BROOK-HOLLAND, supra note 6, at 1. “One country, two
systems” refers to the treaty requirements that Hong Kong would be under the authority of
China but would still be able to “enjoy a high degree of autonomy, except in foreign and
defense affairs.” The Joint Declaration, supra note 6, at 61. Under the Treaty, Hong Kong
autonomy includes being “vested with executive, legislative, and independent judicial power
[with final adjudication],” retaining freedom of speech and individual rights, and maintaining
the HKSAR as a capitalist financial center. The Joint Declaration, supra note 6, at 61–62.
These rights were to be recorded in a Basic Law of KHSAR and “remain unchanged for 50
years.” The Joint Declaration, supra note 6, at 62.
9. Luo Huining, Liaison Off. of the Cent. People’s Gov’t in the HKSAR, Speech at The
Launch Ceremony of Events Marking the 23rd Anniversary of Hong Kong’s Return to the
Motherland (July 1, 2020), http://www.locpg.gov.cn/jsdt/2020-07/01/c_1210684535.htm
[https://perma.cc/5GES-WA7N] (China); see also LAWRENCE & MARTIN, supra note 5, at 1
(“The [People’s Republic of China] and HSKAR governments portray the law as a necessary
measure to close national security ‘loopholes’ in HKSAR law, to move Hong Kong from
‘turmoil to stability’ after a year of sometimes violent protests, and to rebalance the ‘one
country, two systems’ formal to emphasize ‘one country.’”).
10. See LAWRENCE & MARTIN, supra note 5, at 1 (“The law is widely seen as undermining
the HKSAR’s once-high degree of autonomy and eroding the rights promised to Hong Kong
in the 1984 Joint Declaration on the Question of Hong Kong . . . .”).
11. Hong Kong Autonomy Act, Pub. L. No. 116-149, 134 Stat. 663 (2020),
https://www.congress.gov/bill/116th-congress/house-bill/7440/text [https://perma.cc/V4EHPV6K].
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In the past, targeted sanctions have been credited as a success in
countries like Iran because the sanctions exploited power asymmetries
between the U.S. and the targeted country.12 The strength of the U.S.
dollar and access to U.S. financial markets have made it easier for Foreign
Financial Institutions (“FFIs”) and ally countries to align with U.S.
foreign policy goals.13 However, now that the U.S. is using sanction laws
such as the HKAA to put financial pressure on China, enforcing the
sanctions is less effective, especially when many financial institutions
might feel pressure to choose between two dominant global economies.14
In addition, FFIs and U.S. financial firms are increasingly drawn to
China’s untapped capital market15 and long-term investment growth
prospects.16 The potential penalties FFIs face under the HKAA might not
be strong enough to pull these institutions away from China. 17
Further, the U.S. government’s primary purpose in imposing
these sanctions is to encourage democracy over a communist system, as
China has held onto a one system, two-country principle that has
12. See Suzanne Katzenstein, Dollar Unilateralism: The New Frontline of National
Security, 90 Ind. L. J. 293, 306–07 & 343 (2015) (noting that the U.S. targeted sanctions by
relying on U.S. market power in international trade to exploit asymmetries between
governments in the foreign sector).
13. Id. at 343.
14. See Andrew Rennemo, With China Sanctions, America Pushes the Limits of Its
Financial Power, THE DIPLOMAT (June 19, 2020), https://thediplomat.com/2020/06/withchina-sanctions-america-pushes-the-limits-of-its-financial-power/ [https://perma.cc/83Y4RN3T] (“[T]he United States risks harm to its sanctions tool, longstanding alliances, and
ultimately its geopolitical position if its posture remains one dimensional and overly
coercive.”).
15. See Nicholas R. Lardy and Tianlei Huang, Despite the Rhetoric, US-China Financial
Decoupling is Not Happening, PETERSON INST. FOR INT’L ECON. (July 2, 2020, 11:15 AM),
https://www.piie.com/blogs/china-economic-watch/despite-rhetoric-us-china-financialdecoupling-not-happening [https://perma.cc/S8M3-5QZT] (noting that China’s financial
services market is estimated at $47 trillion). In addition, FFIs occupy “less than 2 percent of
the banking assets [markets] and less than 6 percent of the insurance market.” Id.
16. In 2020, China has eased restrictions allowing FFIs easier entry into Chinese markets.
See Crystal Tai & Jing Yang, Wall Street Moves Into China, Despite Tech and Trade Battles,
WALL ST. J. VIDEO (Oct. 7, 2020, 5:30 AM), https://www.wsj.com/video/wall-street-movesinto-china-despite-tech-and-trade-battles/111C45E3-B196-491B-9C830D697C889625.html [https://perma.cc/2X2J-D487]. Notably, the Chinese government no
longer requires a majority ownership in FFIs in China. Id. Several firms have taken advantage
by greatly expanding operations in China in 2020, including JP Morgan and Goldman Sachs.
Id. See generally Jonathan Woetzel et al., China and the World: Inside the Dynamics of a
Changing Relationship, MCKINSEY GLOB. INST. (2019), https://www.mckinsey.com/featuredinsights/china/china-and-the-world-inside-the-dynamics-of-a-changing-relationship
[https://perma.cc/Q85P-YX8A] (discussing the economic prospects in China over this
century).
17. Tai & Yang, supra note 16.
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gradually deteriorated over the past twenty years.18 The passage of the
HKAA has revealed how disconnected U.S. foreign policy goals and
perceptions of China are from financial institutions’ and companies’
investment targets.19 Thus, by choosing to implement economic
sanctions against China, the U.S. could divide financial institutions from
ally countries, undermine its position as a global financial power, and risk
isolating itself from global economic markets in the long-term.20
This Note proceeds in five parts. Part II provides a brief
description of the key provisions impacting financial institutions and the
legislative purpose behind the HKAA and its accompanying executive
order. 21 Part III explores the impact of using the HKAA to target China
and additional compliance requirements imposed on financial institutions
to avoid HKAA penalties.22 Part IV discusses the future implications of
the overuse of economic sanctions by the U.S., specifically regarding
how FFIs might “de-risk” from the U.S.23 Part V concludes by
summarizing and providing a suggestion for how the U.S. should shift its
perspective and strategy toward China going forward. 24
II. BACKGROUND AND PURPOSE OF THE HONG KONG AUTONOMY ACT
The HKAA25 was enacted on July 14, 2020, in response to
China’s passage of the HKSAR Security Law, 26 which gave China
executive and judicial power over the people of Hong Kong, violating the

18. Hong Kong Autonomy Act, Pub. L. No. 116-149, § 3, 134 Stat. 663 (2020),
https://www.congress.gov/bill/116th-congress/house-bill/7440/text [https://perma.cc/V4EHPV6K].
19. See, e.g., Bruce Einhorn, U.S. Businesses in China Not Heeding Trump’s Call to Return
Home,
BLOOMBERG
(Sept.
9,
2020,
12:19
AM),
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-09-09/u-s-businesses-in-china-not-heedingtrump-s-call-to-return-home?sref=uo8ONmoB [https://perma.cc/7L27-MVB2] (noting
disconnect exists since U.S. companies remain interested in China for business despite the
executive branch’s insistence that they return operations to the United States).
20. See infra Part II-IV.
21. See infra Part II.
22. See infra Part III.
23. See infra Part IV.
24. See infra Part V.
25. Hong Kong Autonomy Act (“HKAA”), Pub. L. No. 116-149, 134 Stat. 663 (2020),
https://www.congress.gov/bill/116th-congress/house-bill/7440/text [https://perma.cc/V4EHPV6K].
26. HKSAR Security Law, supra note 4.

2021]

CHINA AND TARGETED SANCTIONS

533

promises contained in the Joint Declaration. 27 Despite this bilateral
agreement between the United Kingdom and China,28 the U.S. Congress
passed the HKAA, imposing sanctions on “foreign persons involved in
the erosion of certain obligations of China with respect to Hong Kong
[via the Joint Declaration], and for other purposes.”29 Sanctions are
imposed on any “foreign person” (“Person”) 30 that the Secretary of State
deems “is materially contributing to, has materially contributed to, or
attempts to materially contribute to the failure of the Government of
China to meet its obligations under the Joint Declaration or the Basic
Law.”31 A Person, which is defined as an individual or entity, “materially
contributes” if the Person committed an action which resulted in
restrictions on Hong Kongers’ personal freedoms, ability to participate in
democratic outcomes, or on the high degree of autonomy in Hong Kong.32
The Secretary of State and Secretary of the Treasury (“Treasury
Secretary”) also can recommend the sanctioning of a financial institution
that “knowingly conducts a significant transaction with a foreign person”
who has materially contributed to the demise of Hong Kong democratic
values.33 The HKAA does not specifically define “foreign financial
institution”; the statute only defines “financial institution” to mean those
27. Under the Security Law Legislation, China suspended many legal rights granted to the
people of Hong Kong. HKSAR Security Law, supra note 4. It also gave China broad power
to imprison people for “acts of secession or subversion of state power,” in light of the protests
to maintain Hong Kong Autonomy. Exec. Order No. 13936, 85 Fed. Reg. 43413, 43413 (July
14,
2020),
https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2020/07/17/2020-15646/thepresidents-executive-order-on-hong-kong-normalization [https://perma.cc/4NGH-BRSL];
see also The Joint Declaration, supra note 7, at 61.
28. In 2019, after the Hong Kong protests began, the UK Foreign Office answered a public
question regarding the Joint Declaration on its website: “[i]f at some stage in the future we
were to take the view that China had breached its
obligations under the Joint Declaration, this would, under international law, be a bilateral
matter between us and China and we would pursue it accordingly.” BROOK-HOLLAND, supra
note 6, at 4 (quoting FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE, UK PARLIAMENT, No. UIN
266293,
HONG KONG: EXTRADITION (June
18,
2019),
https://questionsstatements.parliament.uk/written-questions/detail/2019-06-18/266293
[https://perma.cc/AE5F-ZYQS]). Also, note that the Joint Declaration does not contain any
enforcement or dispute provisions; a breach is assumed to be a suspension of the operation of
the treaty under the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treatises. LOUISE BROOK-HOLLAND,
HOUSE OF COMMONS LIBR., supra note 6, at 3.
29. HKAA § 1, 134 Stat. at 663.
30. HKAA § 2(5), (10), 134 Stat. at 664.
31. HKAA § 5(a), 134 Stat. at 669.
32. HKAA § 5(g), 134 Stat. at 671. Personal freedoms used in the HKAA means “freedom
of assembly, speech, press, or independent rule of law.” Id.
33. HKAA § 5(b), 134 Stat. at 669.
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referenced in 31 U.S.C. § 5312(a)(2). 34 Accordingly, under the HKAA
and 13 U.S.C. § 5312(a)(2), a financial institution involves activities from
a range of entities, including FDIC-insured banks, credit unions, currency
exchanges, insurance companies, and U.S. banks operating
internationally.35 Thus, the HKAA could apply to any financial
institution—foreign or U.S.—involved in a transaction with a Person
identified.36
Further, the financial institution must “knowingly conduct[] a
significant transaction.”37 Although the HKAA does not define
“significant transaction,”38 “knowingly” is defined as “actual knowledge
of the conduct, the circumstance, or the result.”39 In addition, transactions
under the sanctions described include loans from U.S. financial
institutions40 and other banking transactions.41 Considering the broad
authority granted to the Secretary of State, the President, and relevant
federal agencies,42 determining whether an FFI knowingly conducts a

34. HKAA § 2(6), 134 Stat. at 664 (“The term ‘financial institution’ means a financial
institution specified in section 5312(a)(2) of Title 31, United States Code.”).
35. HKAA § 2(6), 134 Stat. at 664; 31 U.S.C. § 5312(a)(2)(A)–(Z). Application to U.S.
financial institutions operating internationally is further supported by the HKAA definition of
“financial institution” which is defined under 31 U.S.C. § 5312(a)(2)(R): "[A] Licensed
sender of money or any other person who engages as a business in the transmission of funds,
including any person who engages as a business in an informal money transfer system or any
network of people who engage as a business in facilitating the transfer of money domestically
or internationally outside of the conventional financial institutions system.” 31 U.S.C. §
5312(a)(2)(R).
36. HKAA § 4(3), 134 Stat. at 668 (“[T]he United States should establish a clear and
unambiguous set of penalties with respect to foreign persons determined by the Secretary of
State, in consultation with the Secretary of the Treasury, to be involved in the contravention
of the obligations of China under the Joint Declaration and the Basic Law and the financial
institutions transacting with those foreign persons.”).
37. HKAA § 5(b), 134 Stat. at 669.
38. HKAA § 2, 134 Stat. at 663–64.
39. HKAA § 2(9), 134 Stat. at 664.
40. HKAA § 7(b)(1), 134 Stat. at 672 (“The United States Government may prohibit any
United States financial institution from making loans or providing credits to the foreign
financial institution.”).
41. HKAA § 7(b)(5), 134 Stat. at 672 (“The President may . . . prohibit any transfers of
credit or payments between financial institutions or by, through, or to any financial institution,
to the extent that such transfers or payments are subject to the jurisdiction of the United States
and involve the foreign financial institution.”).
42. HKAA §§ 4(3)–(5), 5(d), 6(a), 134 Stat. at 668–671.
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significant transaction will likely be “inherently discretionary and highly
fact-specific.”43
Once a Person or FFI is identified by the Secretary of State, the
President imposes the sanctions.44 For Persons found to materially
contribute under the HKAA, the sanctions could include restrictions on
transactions in and holding property in the U.S.,45 exclusion from the
U.S., and revocation of visas and travel documentation.46 However,
many financial analysts have questioned the impact on Persons
sanctioned since the penalties will likely have minimal financial harm
since access to loans and investments is easily attainable in China.47 This
is especially true if the Persons do not own property in the U.S. or have
investments in U.S. currency.48
Compared to sanctions imposed on Persons, the HKAA imposes
much heavier penalties on FFIs and requires U.S. financial institutions
and agencies to enforce these penalties.49 Ten possible sanctions may be
imposed with respect to FFIs for violating the HKAA:

43. Duncan A. W. Abate & Tamer A. Soliman, The Hong Kong Autonomy Act, MAYER
BROWN
(July
17,
2020),
https://www.mayerbrown.com/en/perspectivesevents/publications/2020/07/the-hong-kong-autonomy-act [https://perma.cc/S42Z-PLNY].
44. HKAA § 6-7, 134 Stat. at 671–72.
45. HKAA § 6(b)(1), 134 Stat. at 671 (“The President may . . . prohibit any person from–
(A) acquiring, holding, withholding, using, transferring, withdrawing, transporting, or
exporting any property that is subject to the jurisdiction of the United States and with respect
to which the foreign person has any interest; (B) dealing in or exercising any right, power, or
privilege with respect to such property; or (C) conducting any transaction involving such
property.”) (emphasis added).
46. HKAA § 6(b)(2), 134 Stat. at 671.
47. See Sum Lok-kei & Enoch Yiu, Hong Kong Slams US’ Autonomy Act, Urges
Washington to Refrain from Measures that Could Affect Financial Institution Operations, S.
CHINA MORNING POST (June 26, 2020, 11:30 PM), https://www.scmp.com/news/hongkong/politics/article/3090799/local-observers-believe-us-senates-hong-kong-autonomy-act
[https://perma.cc/N5VP-5JHY] (suggesting that the HKAA sanctions specifically target
individuals to limit “wiping out everyone” with the sanctions because a broader scope would
harm the U.S.’s own economy). A more recent article discusses how the White House has
limited its offensive foreign policy measures on China—led by the globalist Treasury
Secretary Steven Mnuchin—to avoid actions “that could rock the global economy.” Bob
Davis, Kate O’Keeffe, & Lingling Wei, U.S.’s China Hawks Drive Hard-Line Policies After
Trump Turns on Beijing, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 16, 2020, 12:50 PM),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-s-china-hawks-drive-hard-line-policies-after-trump-turnson-beijing-11602867030?st=6ffmvd427b4p4lx [https://perma.cc/44FG-LCUQ].
48. Chi Wang, US Sanctions and Hong Kong Autonomy Act are Empty Gestures that Show
a Failure to Understand, S. CHINA MORNING POST (July 4, 2020, 2:00 AM),
https://www.scmp.com/comment/opinion/article/3091713/us-sanctions-and-hong-kongautonomy-act-are-empty-gestures-show [https://perma.cc/FP4P-53TZ].
49. HKAA § 7, 134 Stat. at 671–72.
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(1) The U.S. Government may prohibit any U.S. financial
institution from making loans or providing credits to
the FFI.
(2) Neither the Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System nor the Federal Reserve Bank of
New York may designate, or permit the continuation
of any prior designation of, the FFI as a primary
dealer in U.S. Government debt instruments.
(3) The FFI may not serve as agent of the U.S.
Government or serve as repository for U.S.
Government funds.
(4) The President may . . . prohibit any transactions in
foreign exchange that are subject to the jurisdiction of
the U.S. and involve the FFI.
(5) The President may . . . prohibit any transfers of credit
or payments between financial institutions or by,
through, or to any financial institution, to the extent
that such transfers or payments are subject to the
jurisdiction of the U.S. and involve the FFI.
(6) The President may . . . prohibit [activities associated
with] any property subject to the jurisdiction of the
U.S. and . . . which the FFI has any interest.
(7) The President, in consultation with the Secretary of
Commerce, may restrict or prohibit exports,
reexports, and transfers (in-country) of commodities,
software, and technology subject to the jurisdiction of
the U.S. directly or indirectly to the FFI.
(8) The President may . . . prohibit any U.S. person from
investing in or purchasing significant amounts of
equity or debt instruments of the FFI.
(9) The President may direct the Secretary of State, in
consultation with the Treasury Secretary and the
Secretary of Homeland Security, to exclude from the
U.S. any alien that is determined to be a corporate
officer or principal of, or a shareholder with a
controlling interest in, the FFI subject to regulatory
exceptions.
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(10) The President may impose on the principal executive
officer or officers of the foreign financial institution,
or on individuals performing similar functions and
with similar authorities as such officer or officers, any
of the sanctions described in paragraphs (1) through
(8) that are applicable. 50
The HKAA first allows the President to impose at least five of these
sanctions; then, the President can impose all of the above sanctions if
expanded sanctions are deemed necessary. 51
Finally, the President’s Executive Order on Hong Kong
Normalization (“Executive Order”) was issued with the enactment of the
HKAA on July 14, 2020.52 Part of the Executive Order expands on the
types of sanctionable actions by individuals who disrupt Hong Kong’s
autonomy.53 The Executive Order also grants authority for implementing
sanctions to the Treasury Secretary, divisions within the Department of
the Treasury (“Treasury”)—including the Office of Foreign Assets
Control (“OFAC”)54—and the Secretary of State.55 Finally, the
Executive Order includes several provisions that reduce the special status
of Hong Kong.56
Section nine of the HKAA states that the President’s authority
and his granting of implementation authority under the executive order is
50. HKAA § 7(b), 134 Stat. at 672–73.
51. HKAA § 7(a), 134 Stat. at 671–72.
52. Exec. Order No. 13936, 85

Fed. Reg. 43413 (July 14, 2020),
https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2020/07/17/2020-15646/the-presidentsexecutive-order-on-hong-kong-normalization [https://perma.cc/4NGH-BRSL].
53. Exec. Order No. 13936, 85 Fed. Reg. at 43415.
54. OFAC is a division of the U.S. Department of the Treasury that manages economic and
trade sanctions related to U.S. foreign policy goals. Office of Foreign Assets Control Sanctions Programs and Information, U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY,
https://home.treasury.gov/policy-issues/office-of-foreign-assets-control-sanctions-programsand-information [https://perma.cc/ZJ5C-48P4] (last visited Feb. 6, 2020) (“The Office of
Foreign Assets Control (“OFAC”) of the US Department of the Treasury administers and
enforces economic and trade sanctions based on US foreign policy and national security goals
against targeted foreign countries and regimes, terrorists, international narcotics traffickers,
those engaged in activities related to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and
other threats to the national security, foreign policy or economy of the United States.”).
55. Exec. Order No. 13936, 85 Fed. Reg. at 43416–17.
56. Exec. Order No. 13936, 85 Fed. Reg. at 43414–15. These additional provisions include
revoking export license exceptions for Hong Kong, removing preference for Hong Kong
passport holders, suspending extradition arrangements with Hong Kong, and terminating
certain tax agreements. Id.
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provided by the International Emergency Economic Powers Act
(“IEEPA”).57 IEEPA was enacted in 197758 and gives the executive
branch broad discretion to oversee “any interest of any foreign country or
national thereof.”59 Likewise, the Executive Order legally authorizes the
Secretary of State and Treasury Secretary—including OFAC—to
designate Persons in violation of the HKAA, implement the Executive
Order, 60 and maintain a list of Specifically Designated Nationals and
Blocked Persons (“SDN List”).61
Finally, although the HKAA is an attempt to maintain the
autonomy of Hong Kong and uphold the obligations established
57. Exec. Order No. 13936, 85 Fed. Reg. at 43413.; see also Hong Kong Autonomy Act,
Pub. L. No. 116-149, § 9(a), 134 Stat. 663, 677 (2020), https://www.congress.gov/bill/116thcongress/house-bill/7440/text [https://perma.cc/V4EH-PV6K] (“The President may exercise
all authorities provided under sections 203 and 205 of the International Emergency Economic
Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1702 and 1704) to the extent necessary to carry out this Act.”).
58. CHRISTOPHER A. CASEY ET AL., CONG. RES. SERV., R45618, THE INTERNATIONAL
EMERGENCY ECONOMIC POWERS ACT: ORIGINS, EVOLUTION, AND USE 2 (2020). The IEEPA
stemmed from the Passage of the Trading with the Enemy Act (“TWEA”) originating in 1917.
Id. at 2–3. Both the IEEPA and the TWEA “sit[] at the center of the modern U.S. sanctions
regime. Id. at i.
59. 50 U.S.C. § 1702(a)(1)(B) (“[T]he President may, under such regulations as he may
prescribe, by means of instructions, licenses, or otherwise . . . investigate, block during the
pendency of an investigation, regulate, direct and compel, nullify, void, prevent or prohibit,
any acquisition, holding, withholding, use, transfer, withdrawal, transportation, importation
or exportation of, or dealing in, or exercising any right, power, or privilege with respect to, or
transactions involving, any property in which any foreign country or a national thereof has
any interest by any person, or with respect to any property, subject to the jurisdiction of the
United States.”); see also CASEY, ET AL., CONG. RES. SERV., R45618, at 44 (noting that the
phrase “any interest of any foreign country or national thereof” grants the executive branch
broad discretion and “[t]he interconnectedness of the modern global economy has left few
major transactions in which a foreign interest is not involved”).
60. Exec. Order No. 13936, 85 Fed. Reg. at 43417 (“The Secretary of the Treasury, in
consultation with the Secretary of State, is hereby authorized to take such actions, including
adopting rules and regulations, and to employ all powers granted to me by IEEPA as may be
necessary to implement this order. The Secretary of the Treasury may, consistent with
applicable law, redelegate any of these functions within the Department of the Treasury.”);
see also HKAA § 5(a), 134 Stat. at 669 (“[T]he Secretary of State, in consultation with the
Secretary of the Treasury, determines that a foreign person is materially contributing to, has
materially contributed to, or attempts to materially contribute to the failure of the Government
of China to meet its obligations under the Joint Declaration or the Basic Law, the Secretary
of State shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees and leadership a report. .
.”).
61. Hong Kong-Related Sanctions Frequently Asked Question No. 848, U.S. DEP’T OF THE
TREASURY—OFF.
OF
FOREIGN
ASSETS
CONTROL,
(Oct.
14,
2020),
https://home.treasury.gov/policy-issues/financial-sanctions/faqs/848
[https://perma.cc/6MDQ-DRD2]; see also Exec. Order No. 13936, 85 Fed. Reg. at 43417
(“The Secretary of the Treasury may, consistent with applicable law, redelegate any of these
functions within the Department of the Treasury [OFAC].”).
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previously by Congress62 in the Hong Kong Policy Act of 199263 and the
Hong Kong Human Rights and Democracy Act of 2019,64 the purpose of
the HKAA is ultimately to further a foreign policy agenda against
China.65 First, section three of the HKAA provides multiple examples of
China’s gradual overstepping of the autonomy of Hong Kong over the
past twenty years.66 Section three concludes by indicating that the HKAA
is a response to “deep[] concern[] [about China’s actions] to the people
of Hong Kong, the U.S., and members of the international community.”67
However, section four of the HKAA and the Congressional
Record provide insight into a broader agenda for implementing the
HKAA.68 First, the HKAA’s underlying purpose is to maintain the “one
country, two systems” regime in Hong Kong,69 despite recognizing that
China had already resumed sovereignty over Hong Kong as of July 1997
and has taken numerous actions to solidify its sovereignty during the
2000s.70 Ultimately, the HKAA is about sending “a larger signal to
China.”71 The U.S. legislators’ intent is to use the HKAA to compel
financial institutions to impose penalties and respond to “escalation of
aggression by the Chinese Communists.”72 The HKAA implements
62. HKAA § 4(1), 134 Stat. at 667–68.
63. United States-Hong Kong Policy Act of 1992, 66 U.S.C. §§ 5701–5732.
64. Hong Kong Human Rights and Democracy Act of 2019, 66 U.S.C. §§ 5725–5726

(adding two sections and amending § 5721 of the U.S.-Hong Kong Policy Act of 1992).
65. SUSAN V. LAWRENCE AND MICHAEL F. MARTIN, CONG. RES. SERV., R46473, CHINA’S
NATIONAL SECURITY LAW FOR HONG KONG: ISSUES FOR CONGRESS 1 (2020); see also 116
CONG. REC. S4179 (daily ed. July 2, 2020) (statement of Sen. Boozman) (discussed further in
next paragraph).
66. See, e.g., HKAA § 3, 134 Stat. at 664–67.
67. HKAA § 3(16), 134 Stat. at 667.
68. HKAA § 4, 134 Stat. at 667–68.
69. HKAA § 4(2), 134 Stat. at 668.
70. See HKAA § 3(9)–(15), 134 Stat. at 665–68 (listing several counts of administrative
action China has asserted over Hong Kong, including passing extradition laws, passing
education laws to “mainlandize” Hong Kong schoolchildren, and taking other enforcement
action against freedom of speech in Hong Kong).
71. 116 CONG. REC. S4179 (daily ed. July 2, 2020) (statement of Sen. Boozman).
72. Id. (“That is part of why the Hong Kong Autonomy Act is so important. It is not only
an effort to shield freedom loving Hongkongers from this continuing escalation of aggression
by the Chinese Communists, but the bill is a larger signal to China. It is a message that the
United States and the free world are no longer willing to look past some of the worst behavior
that has been occurring. It is a message that our patience has run out.”); see also HKAA § 4,
134 Stat. at 668. The HKAA hopes to put pressure on foreign persons and financial institutions
transaction with foreign persons to establish a multilateral sanctions regime; however, as
discussed later, attempts at this multilateral sanctions regime is really forced coercive
diplomacy to encourage allies to side with the U.S. and put pressure on China, in light of the
current U.S.-China economic tensions. HKAA § 4, 134 Stat. at 668.
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economic sanctions to emphasize the power of a democratic political
model over communism.73 In the context of the HKAA, communism is
described as “the dark shadows of the authoritarian governments that are
constantly pushing to systematically erode, corrode, and wrap the values
and freedoms that we cherish.”74 Although economic sanctions have
been popular throughout the twenty-first century regarding countries
such as Russia and Iran,75 using financial institutions to exert pressure
and gain multilateral support will be more challenging under the HKAA,
especially when the central goal is to target China.76
III. FOREIGN FINANCIAL INSTITUTION RESPONSE TO HKAA
The HKAA sanctions exemplify a common foreign policy tool
used by the U.S. government in modern times.77 Compared to traditional
trade sanctions, which overtly target the economy of an entire country,
targeted sanctions attempt to prevent specific individuals or entities from
accessing financial systems.78 The underlying goal of these sanctions—
such as those imposed by the HKAA—is to influence FFIs connected to
the targeted actor by exploiting the power of the dollar as the global
currency.79 Typically, the targeted sanctions and the severe punishment
for non-compliance effectively give financial institutions limited or no
choice but to comply with the HKAA.”80 However, this choice to comply
is not as easy when the underlying target country is China. 81
73. See 116 CONG. REC. S4179 (discussing stopping the spread of communism as the
intentions and purpose of passing the Hong Kong Autonomy Act at multiple points throughout
the record).
74. Id.
75. See generally ROSENBERG ET AL., supra note 1, at 5–6 (discussing the ongoing debate
about the effectiveness of sanctions and evidence of coercive impact on foreign countries).
76. Wang, supra note 48.
77. See generally ROSENBERG ET AL., supra note 1, at 19–26 (summarizing several cases
of economic sanctions since 2002, which includes Iran, Russia, Syria, and Venezuela); see
also Kathy Gilinan, A Boom Time for U.S. Sanctions, THE ATL. (May 3, 2019),
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2019/05/why-united-states-uses-sanctions-somuch/588625/?utm_source=share&utm_campaign=share [https://perma.cc/63CD-DVU5]
(beginning in the early 2000s, the use of targeted economic sanctions has become the “policy
instrument of choice” for the U.S. government).
78. ROSENBERG ET AL., supra note 1, at 11.
79. Katzenstein, supra note 12, at 312.
80. ROSENBERG ET AL., supra note 1, at 10 (describing compliance with sanctions less as a
choice and more of a requirement) (“abide by the sanctions or risk severe consequences”).
81. Stephen Morris & Katrina Manson, Mike Pompeo Renews Attack on HSBC as Bank
Walks Line Between US and China, FIN. TIMES (Aug. 26, 2020), https://on.ft.com/3jhHPTz
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Historical FFI Response to Sanctions

The most recent historical comparisons to the HKAA sanctions
were those imposed on Iran through the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions,
Accountability, and Divestment Act of 201082 and on Russia through the
Ukraine Freedom Support Act of 2014.83 Like the HKAA, the 2010
sanctions on Iran targeted specific individuals, forcing compliance
through a difficult choice between “maintaining ties to certain designated
entities and protecting their access to U.S. banks.”84 These sanctions
leveraged FFIs’ access to the U.S. capital markets, typically required for
cross-border transactions.85
In the past, some banks decided that the potential lost profit from
violating the U.S. sanctions outweighed the loss from the imposed
penalties.86 For example, banks may determine that the penalty is less
than the net revenue gained from interacting with sanctioned individuals
or markets.87 Often this was due to failure to enforce the penalties.88
However, since the Iran sanctions in 2010, the Treasury has penalized
several FFIs—including Credit Suisse, Dutch Bank ING, Standard
Chartered, HSBC, and BNP Paribas89—in an amount totaling more than
$11 billion in fines.90 Most notably, the Treasury fined HSBC $1.9
billion in 2013 and BNP Paribas $8.9 billion for interacting with
[https://perma.cc/5DVG-MGZQ]; Rebecca Isjwara et al., Global Banks in Hong Kong Brace
for Possible Fallout from New US-China Tensions, S&P GLOBAL (July 28, 2020),
https://www.spglobal.com/marketintelligence/en/news-insights/latest-newsheadlines/global-banks-in-hong-kong-brace-for-possible-fallout-from-new-us-chinatensions-59548894 [https://perma.cc/7SFZ-H89Y].
82. Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010, 22 U.S.C.
§§ 8501–8551.
83. Ukraine Freedom Support Act of 2014, 22 U.S.C. §§ 8921–8930.
84. Katzenstein, supra note 12, at 317.
85. ROSENBERG ET AL., supra note 1, at 11; Katzenstein, supra note 12, at 318.
86. See ROSENBERG ET AL., supra note 1, at 10 (arguing that financial sanctions incentivize
banks to act illicitly since the cost-benefit of engaging with sanctioned individuals outweighs
the enforcement action).
87. ROSENBERG ET AL., supra note 1, at 10.
88. See Katzenstein, supra note 12, at 321 (explaining, in the context of Iran, “[f]or years
on end, these banks flagrantly violated these regulations by conducting illicit transactions with
Iran. They likely calculated that the profits from illicit transactions outweighed the risks and
costs of getting caught”).
89. Jamie Robertson, Are Europe’s Banks Being Prosecuted—or Persecuted?¸ BBC (June
30, 2014), https://www.bbc.com/news/business-28021000 [https://perma.cc/BBN6YWXM]; see also Katzenstein, supra note 12, at 320 (citing the specific amounts of the
settlement agreements between these banks and the Treasury).
90. ROSENBERG ET AL., supra note 1, at 10.
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sanctioned individuals from a targeted country.91 Despite some banks
risking the penalty, most FFIs have complied with the U.S. targeted
sanctions to avoid reputational and financial costs associated with
violations.92
B.

Financial Institutions Must Choose a Side

Within the past ten years, banks have typically complied with
U.S. sanctions because the sanctions forced “a stark and costly choice”
between conducting business in the U.S. and the targeted country’s
financial market.93 However, China is a very different economic target
compared to other recent targets of U.S. Sanctions—Iran and Russia.94
When the U.S. targeted both Iran and Russia, choosing access to U.S.
financial markets over the Russian or Iranian markets was an easier
choice for banks.95 First, both Russia and Iran's economies are primarily
driven by one commodity: oil and gas.96 When the U.S. imposed targeted
sanctions on Iran in 2010, mineral fuels, oils, and derivative products
made up 80% of Iran’s export economy—with crude petroleum
comprising 69% of that total.97 Similarly, when the U.S. imposed
sanctions on Russia in 2014, minerals dominated the Russian trade
economy, with crude petroleum, refined petroleum, and petroleum gas
accounting for over 61% of its exports. 98 Finally, both the Iranian and

91. Katzenstein, supra note 12, at 320–21.
92. ROSENBERG ET AL., supra note 1, at 10.
93. Katzenstein, supra note 12, at 319.
94. See Rennemo, supra note 14 (“China’s size and integration with the world economy,

while highly imperfect, is too advanced for purely punitive diplomacy to work.”); Gilinan,
supra note 77.
95. Katzenstein, supra note 12, at 319.
96. Russia Yearly Exports in 2014 Chart, THE OBSERVATORY OF ECON. COMPLEXITY,
https://oec.world/en/profile/country/rus [https://perma.cc/Z6RE-WXQ2] (scroll down to
“Yearly Exports”; then on the Yearly Export chart settings, set “depth” to “HS2” and “year”
to “2014) (last visited Sept. 21, 2020) [hereinafter “Russia 2014”]; Iran Yearly Exports in
2010
Chart,
THE
OBSERVATORY
OF
ECON.
COMPLEXITY,
https://oec.world/en/profile/country/irn [https://perma.cc/LUB8-3P4D] (scroll down to
“Yearly Exports”; then on the Yearly Export chart settings, set depth to HS2 and year to 2010)
(last visited Sept. 21, 2020) [hereinafter “Iran 2010”].
97. THE OBSERVATORY OF ECON. COMPLEXITY (Iran 2010), supra note 96 (noting that data
is retrieved from International Trade Database at the Product Level, BACI,
http://www.cepii.fr/CEPII/en/bdd_modele/presentation.asp?id=37 [https://perma.cc/HB7GHYUS] (last visited Sept. 21, 2020)).
98. THE OBSERVATORY OF ECON. COMPLEXITY (Russia 2014), supra note 96.

2021]

CHINA AND TARGETED SANCTIONS

543

Russian economies pale in comparison to the U.S. economy. 99 Iran’s
$487 billion GDP was dwarfed by the U.S.’ $14.99 trillion GDP in
2010.100 In 2014, Russia’s $2.06 trillion was asymmetrical to the U.S.’s
$17.52 trillion market value.101
Despite Russia and Iran’s smaller market opportunity and
economic dependence on a single commodity, policy scholars have
questioned the effectiveness of the modern targeted sanctions in
effectuating economic harm. 102 Other scholars have questioned the
government aggregation measures, which exaggerate sanctions'
effectiveness by failing to consider other factors outside of U.S. sanctions
implementation.103 Further, the impacts on Russia and Iran could have
resulted from collapsing oil prices and internal mismanagement rather
than U.S. sanctions imposition alone.104 Sanctioned countries like Russia
have learned to adapt to a “new normal”105 under these economic
sanctions, turning the U.S. sanctions imposed on their countries into an
opportunity for domestic policies and internal economic growth.106 Due
99.
GDP
in
Current
U.S.
Dollars
2010,
THE
WORLD
BANK,
https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD?view=map&year=2010
[https://perma.cc/8KFD-QW6F] (set chart year to 2010, then scroll down to data table below
the world chart) [hereinafter THE WORLD BANK–GDP 2010]; GDP in Current U.S. Dollars
2014,
THE
WORLD
BANK,
https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD?view=map&year=2014
[https://perma.cc/8KFD-QW6F] (set chart year to 2014, then scroll down to data table below
the world chart) [hereinafter THE WORLD BANK–GDP 2014].
100. THE WORLD BANK–GDP 2010, supra note 99.
101. THE WORLD BANK–GDP 2014, supra note 99.
102. See ROSENBERG ET AL., supra note 1, at 18 (finding that targeted sanctions have
minimal impact on a country’s GDP growth, but instead elevate investor’s perceptions of risk
toward engaging with the sanctioned country). Despite findings of short-term effectiveness of
sanctions due to their correlation with investor’s risk perceptions, Rosenberg warns that “[o]ur
definition of sanctions’ effectiveness is predicated on the notion that sanctions alone generally
cannot change regime behavior and must be used and evaluated along with other tools of
national power, such as military force, diplomacy, cyber capabilities, and intelligence
activities.” Id. at 19–20.
103. ROSENBERG ET AL., supra note 1, at 12 (citing Eugene Gholz & Llewleyn Hughes,
Market Structure and Economic Sanctions: the 2010 Rare Earth Elements Episode as a
Pathway Case of Market Adjustment, R. OF INT’L POL. ECON. (2019),
https://doi.org/10.1080/09692290.2019.1693411 [https://perma.cc/JRF3-QASY]).
104. ROSENBERG ET AL., supra note 1, at 12 (citing Jay Solomon & Summer Said, Why
Saudis Decided Not to Prop Up Oil, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 21, 2014, 10:33 PM),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/why-saudis-decided-not-to-prop-up-oil-1419219182
[https://perma.cc/P6HA-ZQZM]).
105. ROSENBERG ET AL., supra note 1, at 12 (quoting Glen Biglaiser & David Lektzian, The
Effect of Sanctions on US Foreign Direct Investment, 65 INT’L ORG. 531–551 (2011)).
106. Henry Foy, Russia: Adapting to Sanctions Leaves Economy in Robust Health, FIN.
TIMES (Jan. 29, 2020), https://on.ft.com/2A41hSE [https://perma.cc/YY9L-EPPC].
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to targeted sanctions and a loss of foreign investors, Russia adapted by
finding new trade markets in Asia and Africa and strengthening domestic
production.107 Ironically, economic analysts now fear the most
prominent danger to the Russian economy is the U.S. deciding to lift the
imposed sanctions on Russian individuals.108 If the U.S. lifts sanctions
against Russia, Russia’s now stabilized economic growth will be shocked
by the return of foreign capital, disrupting its domestic policies in place
and currency rate. 109
However, without considering the arguable ineffectiveness of
targeted sanctions, the HKAA complicates FFIs’ decisions to comply due
to China’s role as a global power.110 Unlike other countries sanctioned
by the U.S., China is the only country that can compete with the U.S. in
terms of economic scale.111 In 2019, China ranked second in real GDP
at $14.343 trillion to the U.S. at $21.374 trillion.112 As of August 2020,
China had further decreased the gap with the U.S. economy, with
estimates showing China's real GDP as approaching $20 trillion.113
Amongst many other indicators of China’s economic force, 114 China is
projected to reach GDP parity with the U.S. economy in 2028.115
Due to China’s economic growth and future potential, several
U.S. companies and FFIs have developed long-term expansion plans into

107. Foy, supra note 107.
108. Foy, supra note 107.
109. Foy, supra note 107.
110. Rennemo, supra note 14.
111. See Woetzel et al., supra note 16, at 138 (discussing the importance of evaluating the

economic drivers and potential revenue to be earned in China for companies in the long term).
112.
GDP
in
Current
U.S.
Dollars
2019,
THE
WORLD
BANK,
https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD?view=map&year=2019
[https://perma.cc/8KFD-QW6F] (set chart year to 2019, then scroll down to data table below
the world chart) [hereinafter THE WORLD BANK–GDP 2019].
113. Johnathan Cheng, China’s Economy is Bouncing Back—And Graining Ground on the
U.S., WALL ST. J. (Aug. 24, 2020, 3:04 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/chinas-economyis-bouncing-backand-gaining-ground-on-the-u-s-11598280917?st=3ld9y7lt2tvvwcy
[https://perma.cc/58WW-AQS8].
114. China became the world’s largest economy in purchasing-power-parity in 2014,
became the largest trading nation in goods in 2013, has comparable numbers of Global
Fortune 500 companies as the U.S., and ranks second in receiving and being the source of
foreign direct investment (FDI). Woetzel et al., supra note 16, at 1.
115. Cheng, supra note 112. (“Homi Kharas, a senior global economics and development
fellow at the Brookings Institution, said the coronavirus puts China’s economy on track to
reach parity with the U.S. in 2028 in absolute terms, using current dollars—two years faster
than his pre-coronavirus estimate.”).
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China, including Citigroup and JPMorgan Chase & Co.116 McKinsey
Global Institute estimates that there is $22 trillion to $37 trillion of
economic value—or 15% to 26% of global GDP by 2040—for global
investment opportunities depending on the level of engagement between
China and other nations.117 Despite the downside due to trade tensions,
the economic investment opportunities due to China’s growth are
attractive. 118 Some of the long-term initiatives for foreign companies in
China include designating China as a center for global growth or as a
niche market for China’s strongest economic sectors. 119
The size of the Chinese economy and high interest of U.S.-backed
companies and foreign institutions in China create a major dilemma for
global banks with a client base in Hong Kong (notably HSBC, Standard
Chartered, Citigroup, Bank of America, and JP Morgan Chase). 120 To
further complicate financial institutions' decisions, China’s Ministry of
Foreign Affairs announced sanctions on U.S. officials,121 countering the
HKAA.122 China’s authority for sanctioning U.S. officials is under
Article 29 of the HKSAR Security Law 123 by “forbidding sanctions,
blockades or hostile activities against the financial hub and China.”124
China’s HKSAR Security Law turns a bank’s decision to comply with

116. Cathy Chan, How Hong Kong Sanctions Could Threaten Wall Street, BLOOMBERG
(July 7, 2020, 5:00 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-07-07/how-hongkong-sanctions-could-threaten-wall-street-quicktake?sref=x6qPv4jT
[https://perma.cc/6MM6-L2HD] (last updated Aug. 11, 2020, 12:32 AM).
117. Woetzel et al., supra note 16, at viii.
118. McKinsey recommended that despite continued trade tensions and rising debt,
“companies would do well to look at the fundamentals of China’s economy, which, in many
respects, has continued growth momentum. As we noted in chapter 4, the drivers of
consumption growth, including rising incomes, intergenerational transfers, and Chinese
consumers’ desire to trade up, may remain solid.” Woetzel et al., supra note 16, at 138.
119. Id.
120. Isjwara et al., supra note 81.
121. Press Release, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, Foreign
Ministry Spokesperson Zhao Lijian's Regular Press Conference on August 10, 2020 (Aug. 10,
2020), https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/xwfw_665399/s2510_665401/t1805288.shtml
[https://perma.cc/PP5K-6M9C].
122. Cathy Chan, Global Banks Risk Breaching China Law by Complying with U.S.,
BLOOMBERG (July 9, 2020, 12:00 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-0709/global-banks-risk-breaching-china-law-by-complying-with-u-s?sref=uo8ONmoB
[https://perma.cc/SW3R-4EM7].
123. HKSAR Security Law, supra note 4 (“imposing sanctions or blockades, or engaging
in other hostile activities against the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region or the
People’s Republic of China [is an unlawful offense]”).
124. Chan, supra note 121.
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the U.S. sanctions125 into a choice between betting on the growth of the
U.S. or the Chinese economy.126 Regardless, either decision requires
global banks to appease both U.S. and Chinese authorities,127 as all of
these banks are highly connected in the global economy. 128
C.

Banks’ Responses to the HKAA and U.S.-China Tensions

First, U.S. banks in Hong Kong face direct pressure to end
business with the individuals sanctioned under the HKAA.129 Despite the
Hong Kong Monetary Authority’s claim that the HKAA sanctions have
“no legal status” within the Territory, U.S. financial institutions could
still face the consequences in the U.S.130 Some lawyers noted that “U.S.
banks’ foreign subsidiaries that are incorporated overseas are generally
understood to be non-U.S. entities, which could put them outside
Washington’s jurisdiction.”131 However, even though foreign branches
of U.S. banks have been treated as “separate entities” under the Separate
Entity Doctrine,132 a U.S. bank’s foreign branch is still subject to the laws
of both the U.S. and the country where it is situated.133

125. Isjwara et al., supra note 81.
126. See Thomas Hale, Why Trump’s Hong Kong Sanctions are Bad News for Banks, FIN.

TIMES (Aug. 11, 2020), https://on.ft.com/3iuA6Rw [https://perma.cc/7PL3-BNQL]
(suggesting how the HKAA creates uncertainty for both U.S. and non-U.S. banks regarding
how to respond to sanctions, especially given the number of international transactions
conducted in Hong Kong—and implicitly China—using U.S. dollars).
127. Isjwara et al., supra note 81.
128. Cathy Chan et al., Citi, StanChart Eye Accounts of Sanctioned Hong Kong Officials,
BLOOMBERG (Aug. 10, 2020, 3:25 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-0810/hong-kong-bankers-move-to-suspend-accounts-after-u-s-sanctions?sref=uo8ONmoB
[https://perma.cc/T32Z-DPH6].
129. Hale, supra note 126.
130. Thomas Hale, Hong Kong and China Hit Back at US Sanctions, FIN. TIMES (Aug. 8,
2020), https://on.ft.com/2DLywMh [https://perma.cc/U5UD-8WQL].
131. Hale, supra note 126.
132. The Separate Entity Doctrine spans several statutes and regulations. See Fed. Res.
Bd., Meeting between Federal Reserve Board Staff and Representatives of Foreign Banking
Organizations
(July
9,
2012),
https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/rrcommpublic/Industry_Meeting_20120709.pdf [https://perma.cc/W759-9GRS]. Deposits at
U.S. foreign branches are non-reservable, non-insured, and subordinated in right of payment
to domestic deposits. Id. (citing 12 C.F.R. § 204.128; 12 U.S.C. § 1818(m)(2); 12 U.S.C. §
1221(d)(11)); see also 12 C.F.R. § 211.4; U.C.C. §§ 4-107, 4A-105(a)(2) (AM. L. INST. &
UNIF. L. COMM’N 2019).
133. 12 C.F.R. § 211.1; Gerard Comizio & Ryan Chiachiere, “Ringfencing” U.S. Bank
Foreign Branch Deposits: Working Toward a Clearing Understanding of Where Deposits are
Payable in the Midst of Chaos, 3 Am. U. L. Rev. 249, 251 (2014).
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Thus, it is not surprising that Citigroup has complied with the
HKAA sanctions, as it is a U.S. institution.134 Citigroup is also the only
bank of its prime competitors (Standard Chartered and HSBC) to suspend
the accounts of the eleven initially sanctioned individuals under the
HKAA in August 2020.135 Standard Chartered is reviewing relationships
and monitoring accounts but noted that it would only suspend new
account openings by HKAA-targeted individuals.136 However, although
HSBC has claimed to follow the same precautions as Standard Chartered,
HSBC has been publicly flagged by the U.S. as contributing to the
Chinese overtaking of Hong Kong.137
Citigroup is likely required to strictly comply with the HKAA, as
the Federal Reserve still regulates it under Regulation K,138 and noncompliance could result in additional penalties for its U.S. branches
operating internationally.139 Likewise, Citigroup—and other U.S.
financial institutions that might become subject to HKAA if additional
persons or corporate entities are added—will require extensive due
diligence and bank portfolio reviews for involved entities or
individuals.140 Further, additional diligence will likely impact other
investors, multinational companies, and any other entities with business
in Hong Kong.141 The entities' diligence process will likely be extensive
134. Chan et al., supra note 128.
135. Chan et al., supra note 128.
136. Chan et al., supra note 128.
137. Harry Wilson & Alfred Liu, U.S. Blasts HSBC for Siding with China Over Hong

Kong,
BLOOMBERG
(Aug.
27,
2020,
4:39
AM),
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-08-26/u-s-blasts-hsbc-for-siding-withchina-over-future-of-hong-kong?sref=uo8ONmoB [https://perma.cc/532J-J73V].
138. 12 C.F.R. § 211. Under Regulation K rules, the international operations of U.S.
banking organizations are still under the authority of the Federal Reserve Board and regulated
under the Federal Reserve Act, Bank Holding Company Act, and International Banking Act.
Id.
139. See Giovanna M. Cinelli et al., Executive Order on Hong Kong Normalization:
Extension and Expansion of the Hong Kong Autonomy Act, MORGAN LEWIS (July 28, 2020),
https://www.morganlewis.com/pubs/executive-order-on-hong-kong-normalizationextension-and-expansion-of-the-hong-kong-autonomy-act [https://perma.cc/HVZ7-CGXF]
(“Given the depth and complexity of financial dealings in Hong Kong, parties operating in
the city will need to understand even more than previously whether their dealings involve
parties who are or could be subject to these sanctions, which can impact virtually all
transactions, including securities trades, equity or debt investments, loans and financings,
foreign exchange, and other banking activities.”).
140. Abate & Soliman, supra note 43; see also Cinelli et al., supra note 139.
141. Cinelli et al., supra note 139 (“For example, dealings with persons or entities in Hong
Kong will require enhanced due diligence and more detailed examination of individuals and
entities . . . involved in transactions.”).
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and include following financial trails of individuals and entities
associated with sanctioned persons and examining a broad range of assets
(securities, commodities, derivative instruments) from linked
transactions.142 Ultimately, the HKAA sanctions create overhead
expenses for the U.S. banks, as they are required to respond immediately
and likely will conduct more extensive diligence on Hong Kong and
Chinese transactions to prepare for a quick exit strategy if necessary.143
However, FFIs are better able to wait and see how both the Chinese and
U.S. governments continue to respond before taking drastic action.144 For
example, Standard Chartered appeased both Chinese and U.S. authorities
by publicly supporting the Chinese Security Law imposed on Hong
Kong145 while also avoiding reputational damage from the U.S. by not
evading the HKAA sanctions.146
HSBC has chosen an alternative route by electing to ignore the
risk of HKAA penalties by continuing to support sanctioned
individuals.147 However, HSBC’s choice not to comply with the U.S.
sanctions under the HKAA is more than a choice to accept the risk of
financial penalties as it has been in the past.148 Now, HSBC chooses to
bet on the investment prospects in China compared to relying on U.S.
financial systems.149
HSBC’s choice to support China shows a realization of the
bargaining asymmetries between the U.S. government and foreign
banks.150 Unlike with prior targeted sanctions, HSBC realized it has the
upper hand against the U.S. government, especially since it makes 90%

142. Id.
143. See id. (“For example, dealings with persons or entities in Hong Kong will require

enhanced due diligence and more detailed examination of individuals and entities . . . involved
in transactions.”).
144. Isjwara et al., supra note 81.
145. Marion Dakers & Harry Wilson, Hong Kong’s Two British Banks Back Beijing in
Security
Law
Fight,
BLOOMBERG
(June
3,
2020,
1:23
PM),
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-06-03/standard-chartered-supports-china-snational-security-law?sref=uo8ONmoB [https://perma.cc/MRK7-HJXX].
146. Wilson & Liu, supra note 136.
147. Id.
148. LAWRENCE & MARTIN, supra note 65; see also ROSENBERG ET AL., supra note 1, at 10
(describing compliance with sanctions less as a choice and more as a requirement: “abide by
the sanctions or risk severe consequences”).
149. Wilson & Liu, supra note 136.
150. Katzenstein, supra note 12, at 343.

2021]

CHINA AND TARGETED SANCTIONS

549

of its profit in Asian markets.151 HSBC has been gradually shrinking its
“struggling operations in Europe and the U.S.”152 For example, HSBC
already cut 35,000 jobs in its investment bank in the U.S. and Europe
earlier this year.153 HSBC Chairman Mark Tucker took the position that
“there was too much political risk not to support Chinese authorities; they
are the long-term future of Hong Kong, forget everything else.”154
Unlike Iran or Russia sanctions, the U.S. government does not
have the bargaining power to control foreign institutions’ that may be
willing to forego reliance on the U.S. dollar in order to continue investing
in Chinese growth opportunities.155 Even Standard Chartered has noted
the shift: “[m]inus our Hong Kong operations, StanChart is non-existent.
Our usual approach is to aggressively sit on the fence as these are no-win
issues, but in the past, it has not been a ‘you are with us or else’
situation.”156 The revenue potential in China is strong enough that
foreign banks like HSBC are willing to find workarounds to maintain
relationships with sanctioned individuals by transacting completely
outside the U.S. financial system or without correspondent banks based
in the U.S.157 Further, the U.S. government’s relationship with FFI’s is
interdependent, which limits the reach of U.S. bargaining power. 158
IV. FUTURE IMPACTS FROM OVERUSE OF SANCTIONS
While the HKAA and other recent U.S. political developments
have undertones of intentional separation from China, if the U.S.
government maintains a protectionist stance against China, there could
be negative consequences to the U.S. financial system, such as isolation
151. Stephen Morris & Katrina Manson, Mike Pompeo Renews Attack on HSBC as Bank
Walks Line Between US and China, FIN. TIMES (Aug. 26, 2020), https://on.ft.com/3jhHPTz
[https://perma.cc/5DVG-MGZQ].
152. Wilson & Liu, supra note 136.
153. Simon Clark & Margot Patrick, HSBC to Cut 35,000 Jobs and $100 Billion of Assets,
WALL ST. J. (Feb. 18, 2020, 4:19 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/hsbc-holdings-2019-netprofit-plunged-53-11582001092 [https://perma.cc/4YP6-BB5N].
154. Stephen Morris, Henny Sender, & Laura Noonan, HSBC Wobbles on a Geopolitical
Tightrope, FIN. INST. (June 9, 2020), https://www.ft.com/content/cc35f8e2-83af-4225-826cb2d99e51ee5e [https://perma.cc/XUJ7-HD3M].
155. Katzenstein, supra note 12, at 343.
156. Morris, et al,, supra note 153.
157. Hale, supra note 126.
158. Katzenstein, supra note 12, at 343 (“[T]he U.S. government depends on banks like
HSBC almost as much as such banks depend on U.S. markets. This interdependency
constrains the government in implementing its various harnessing tactics.”).
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from key investment markets.159 Even as the executive branch transitions
from the Trump to Biden administration, many of the economic policies,
especially regarding China, are expected to remain intact. 160
A.

Disconnect Between U.S. Foreign Policy and U.S. Entities

Economic sanctions are a form of protectionist trade policy161 and
historically have had negative consequences on the American
economy.162 For example, in 1930, the U.S. was engaged in protectionist
trade policies.163 In an attempt to protect U.S. agricultural communities
from the side effects of industrialization, the Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act

159. See Woetzel et al., supra note 16, at 120 (discussing how protectionist trade policies
in the past resulted in negative economic consequences spanning the global markets).
160. John Hilsenrath & Nick Timiraos, Biden’s Economic Team Charts a New Course for
Globalization, With Trumpian Undertones, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 1, 2020, 4:22 PM),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/biden-economic-team-trade-trump-globalization11606848311 [https://perma.cc/2VAN-W25R]. Although Biden hopes to carve out a third
way to work with China—possibly using multilateral trade agreement—Biden is still expected
to maintain several Trump policies to balance the bipartisan perspective toward taking a tough
stance with penalties against China. Id. In addition, even if Biden now disagrees tariffs are
the wrong approach to China, the use of sanctions was still heavily implemented under the
Obama administration. Id. Ultimately, Biden is expected to focus on getting the “domestic
house in order” before changing foreign policy or entering into new trade deals. Id; see also
Ana Swanson, Biden’s China Policy? A Balancing Act for a Toxic Relationship, N.Y. TIMES
(Nov. 16, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/11/16/business/economy/biden-chinatradepolicy.html?campaign_id=2&emc=edit_th_20201117&instance_id=24175&nl=todaysheadli
nes&regi_id=47793912&segment_id=44667&user_id=4ac32389a14e999477edae019c4494
a1 [https://perma.cc/TDP7-4TJ5].
161. Lily Kuo, Trump’s China Tariffs Risk ‘Tit-for-Tat Protectionism’ that Threatens
World Economy, THE GUARDIAN (Mar. 22, 2018, 3:38 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/usnews/2018/mar/22/trump-sanctions-tariffs-china-trade-wars
[https://perma.cc/M4TFAEA7]; see also Holly Ellyatt, Putin Takes Another Wipe at Protectionism, ‘Sanctions, Bans
and
Political
Bias,
CNBC
(Sept.
12,
2018,
1:48
AM),
https://www.cnbc.com/2018/09/12/putin-takes-another-swipe-at-protectionism-attackssanctions-bans-and-political-bias.html [https://perma.cc/C22K-RW34].
162. See Robert Z. Lawrence and Robert E. Litan, Why Protectionism Doesn’t Pay, HARV.
BUS.
R.
(1987),
https://hbr.org/1987/05/why-protectionism-doesnt-pay
[https://perma.cc/MP5T-3Z5D] (considering how low wages abroad and claims of unfair
trade practices did not drive the U.S. trade deficit in the 1980s and how protectionist policies
are costly and harmful to the American economy.
163. Woetzel et al., supra note 16, at 120; Alan Reynolds, The Smoot-Hawley Tariff and
the
Great
Depression,
CATO INST.
(May
7,
2016,
3:27
PM),
https://www.cato.org/blog/smoot-hawley-tariff-great-depression
[https://perma.cc/JF63NX2E].
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(“Tariff Act”)164 was passed in 1930.165 While the Tariff Act's passage
was only one of the precipitating factors of the Great Depression, the
anticipation of U.S. protectionist policies along with foreign investors’
negative sentiments encouraged foreign lenders and investors to
withdraw from the U.S. markets.166
Today, investors try to anticipate laws and shifts in political
policies to minimize the effects on business operations and profit
margins.167 Investors are already anticipating further U.S. trade
protectionist policies against China to continue into the Biden
administration,168 heightened by the U.S.’s passage of the HKAA and
track record of using FFIs to impose its economic sanctions.169 Although
the HKAA thus far only sanctions twenty-nine individuals as of
December 2020,170 there is a fear that the sanctions list could be expanded
to include up to ninety million people, considering the number of stateowned Chinese companies and the number of Chinese Communist Party
members.171 Major U.S. financial institutions have over $71 billion172 in
exposure to China, and increased sanctions on Chinese individuals and
entities threaten U.S. banks and their growth plans and potential
incomes.173 Additional sanctions on China will limit U.S. institutions’

164. Alternatively called the “Tariff Act of 1930.” Tariff Act of 1930, 19 U.S.C. §§ 1202–
1683 (2018); 19 U.S.C. § 1654 (2018) (Short Title); see also Reynolds, supra note 162.
165. Woetzel et al., supra note 16, at 1.
166. Reynolds, supra note 162 (“The massive withdrawal of foreign lenders from the
broker-loan market in early October probably reflected the correctly anticipated decline in the
value of the collateral for those loans (stocks), and the fear among foreign capitalists that they
would have to liquidate such assets to stay solvent in a world of high tariffs. The process
contributed to the crash as both cause and effect.”).
167. Id.
168. Even with the change of executive administration, a tough stance against China is
expected to continue as Biden intends to focus on “investments into American industry.”
Swanson, supra note 160.
169. Chan, supra note 116.
170. Sanctions List Search, OFF. OF FOREIGN ASSETS CONTROL (Dec. 10, 2020, 10:05 AM),
https://sanctionssearch.ofac.treas.gov/ (using program code—“HK-EO13936”—which has
been designated for the HKAA and its accompany executive order) [https://perma.cc/6D8N4SRB] (last retrieved Dec. 10, 2020).
171. Chan, supra note 116.
172. “The five big U.S. banks had a combined $71 billion of exposure to China in 2019,
with JPMorgan clocking the biggest investment at $19 billion.” Id.
173. Chan, supra note 116; see also Bloomberg News, Wall Street Has Billions to Lose in
China From Rising Strain, BLOOMBERG (May 28, 2020, 5:22 AM),
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-05-28/wall-street-has-billions-to-lose-inchina-from-mounting-tension?sref=uo8ONmoB [https://perma.cc/2T4R-9BBG].
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opportunities while foreign investors gain.174 Goldman Sachs estimates
that foreign firms are competing for a considerable share of China’s
brokerage industry, which is expected to hit $47 billion by 2026.175
Further, the Senate's Congressional Record on the day of the
HKAA passage indicates the disconnect between the U.S. government
and U.S. investors regarding how to approach a relationship with
China.176 Throughout the HKAA, the only mention of financial
institutions involves using the banks to impose economic sanctions in
response to China passing the HKSAR Security Law.177 Additionally,
the Congressional Record of the HKAA emphasizes how the sanctions
are intended to “penalize[] banks that choose to finance the erosion of
Hong Kong’s autonomy.”178
This statement emphasizes how
disconnected the U.S. legislative and executive branches are from what
U.S. institutions and companies have to lose from these policies 179 by
intentionally ignoring the interconnectivity between China, the U.S., and
Hong Kong.180
Protectionist ideas have emanated from U.S. politicians despite
U.S. companies’ resistance and push forward on Chinese investments.181
The Trump administration threatened to impose “massive tariffs,” 182
decouple from the Chinese market, and even block U.S. companies that
outsource jobs to China from receiving federal contracts.183 Although the

174. Chan, supra note 116; see also Bloomberg News, supra note 173.
175. Chan, supra note 116.
176. 116 CONG. REC. S4179 (daily ed. July 2, 2020) (statement of Sen. Boozman).
177. Hong Kong Autonomy Act, Pub. L. No. 116-149, 134 Stat. 663 (2020),

https://www.congress.gov/bill/116th-congress/house-bill/7440/text [https://perma.cc/V4EHPV6K].
178. 116 CONG. REC. S4179.
179. See Bloomberg News, supra note 173 (discussing the large amounts of exposure—
meaning billions of dollars to lose—U.S. banks have tied to the Chinese economy).
180. See Chan et al., supra note 128 (quoting a strategy consultant in Hong Kong, who
suggests that banks would be hard pressed to decide to cut off customers given they have an
“international footprint that straddles the U.S., Hong Kong, and mainland China”).
181. Tom Mitchel, US Companies Defy Trump’s Threats about Decoupling from China,
FIN. TIMES (Sept. 9, 2020), https://on.ft.com/2DHZy7r [https://perma.cc/UPU5-DYHA].
182. Remarks by President Trump in Press Conference, The White House (Sept. 7, 2020),
https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-president-trump-pressconference-september-7-2020/ [https://perma.cc/3UFJ-K7RH] (“Whether it’s decoupling or
putting in massive tariffs like I’ve been doing already, we’re going to end our reliance on
China because we can’t rely on China.”).
183. Id. (“[W]e’ll impose tariffs on companies that desert America to create jobs in China
and other countries . . . .[and] prohibit federal contracts from companies that outsource to
China.”).
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Biden administration is unlikely to impose new sanctions, the current
policies against China are likely to continue,184 especially as Biden has
openly expressed taking a strong stance against China.185 In addition, the
Biden administration will still have to balance the interests of Congress,
which continues to maintain strong bipartisan support for taking a stance
against China, citing national security concerns. 186 While Biden’s
approach may differ—for example, by seeking support of European allies
to increase bargaining power—Biden’s main priority remains the same
as Trump’s.187 Similar to the Trump administration, Biden’s plan focuses
on domestic policies and programs to alleviate the economic burdens on
Americans affected by global trade confrontations.188
Meanwhile, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce in Shanghai
surveyed U.S. businesses and found that the majority of those surveyed
intend to continue pursuing business interests in China, despite the rising
tensions in U.S.-China relations.189 Further, some of these businesses
with interests in China are instead pushing for the Biden administration
to keep current policies intact to be used as a bargaining point to force
Chinese concessions on core economic policies.190 Ultimately, economic
sanctions like the HKAA and the current political tension between the
U.S. and China are not likely to dissuade either U.S. or international
financial institutions and companies from forgoing lending and financial

184. Current policies against China are expected to continue especially after the
appointment of Janet Yellen to Treasury Secretary; one close to the future Treasury Secretary
expects “the new administration to be reluctant to remove tariffs on China but to explore
removing tariffs in other areas that affect allies, such as steel and aluminum.” Hilsenrath &
Timiraos, supra note 160.
185. Swanson, supra note 160 (“Mr. Biden has said the United States must get ‘tough with
China,’ and referred to Xi Jinping, the Chinese leader, as a ‘thug.’”).
186. Swanson, supra note 160.
187. Hilsenrath & Timiraos, supra note 160.
188. Id. (“Biden has signaled he wants to push allies for help confronting China and press
for more aggressive programs domestically to help Americans hurt by trade . . .”); see also
Swanson, supra note 160 (“Mr. Biden promised to make significant investments into
American industry, including $300 billion in technology industries that he said would create
three million “good-paying” jobs, as well as channeling more government dollars into
purchasing American products like automobiles and pharmaceuticals.”).
189. Einhorn, supra note 19; Thomas Hale et al., Vanguard Uproots Staff from Hong Kong
to Focus on Shanghai, FIN. TIMES (Aug. 26, 2020), https://www.ft.com/content/46683cde9707-4023-9378-52e6491f8817 [https://perma.cc/YUS9-ELMB].
190. Hilsenrath & Timiraos, supra note 160.
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opportunities in China.191 However, the use of sanction actions such as
the HKAA, which will likely continue given the bipartisan support of the
protectionist foreign policy agenda,192 could have negative implications
on the U.S. financial system, as international financial institutions attempt
to de-risk from the U.S. economy.193
B.

De-risking from the U.S. Markets and Possible Long-Term
Impact

If the U.S. continues to use foreign banks to impose economic
sanctions, it could lead foreign institutions to de-risk from the U.S. by
pursuing relationships in other countries. 194 Continued challenges with
U.S. regulations, along with increased growth in China, could create
shifts that weaken the dollar’s dominance as the world currency. 195
Finally, the overuse of sanctions and disengagement with China could
tarnish future relationships with developing countries. 196 This approach
could weaken U.S. bargaining position later in the twenty-first century as
many developing countries take a larger role in the global economy.197
1. U.S. Economic Sanctions Causing Banks to De-risk
The U.S. Department of State defines “de-risking” as “the
phenomenon of financial institutions terminating or restricting business
191. See Einhorn, supra note 19 (citing a survey by the American Chamber of Commerce
in Shanghai that reports that 75% of companies do not intend to relocate out of China, despite
Trump’s remarks).
192. Even as the United States shifts to the Biden administration, there is strong bipartisan
support for continuing a tough stance against Chinese economic policies and trade actions.
Swanson, supra note 160 (“Congress is also relatively unified on taking a tough stance on
China. Hundreds of China-related bills are circulating, including several bipartisan efforts that
echo Mr. Biden’s emphasis on competing with China by investing in American industries like
quantum computing and artificial intelligence.”); see also Dave Michaels & Alexander
Osipovich, Congress Sets Stage for Exiling Chinese Stocks from U.S. Over Audit Dispute,
WALL ST. J. (Dec. 2, 2020), https://www.wsj.com/articles/congress-sets-stage-for-exilingchinese-stocks-from-u-s-over-audit-dispute-11606946071
[https://perma.cc/8VF8-6YEP]
(noting that legislation in response to Chinese trade concerns continue to pass unanimously).
193. ROSENBERG ET AL., supra note 1, at 36.
194. Financial institutions have begun de-risking from the United States in the past in
response to sanctions on Iran and Russia, so I propose this will definitely continue with China.
ROSENBERG ET AL., supra note 1, at 35.
195. ROSENBERG ET AL., supra note 1, at 35; see also infra Part VI.B.2.
196. Rennemo, supra note 14; see infra Part VI.B.3.
197. Leslie McCullough, AidData Sheds Light on Chinese Foreign Aid, WM & MARY (July
8, 2020), https://www.wm.edu/news/stories/2020/aiddata-sheds-light-on-chinese-foreignaid.php [https://perma.cc/MQ4T-9TV3]; See infra Part VI.B.3.
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relationships with clients or categories of clients to avoid, rather than
manage risk.”198 As a response to increasing threats of economic sanction
penalties, U.S. financial institutions and FFIs have begun de-risking their
portfolios from clients in countries seen as high-risk for sanction
violations.199 A major component of de-risking is reducing “foreign
correspondent banking accounts.”200 These accounts act like several of
the banks in Hong Kong—foreign banks operating in one country
maintain accounts at a U.S. financial institution to allow clients to
conduct U.S. dollar transactions.201 Because banks can be found to have
violated U.S. economic sanctions without explicit knowledge—and only
need to be connected to an individual who has “materially
contributed”202—financial institutions have begun to terminate links to
foreign bank accounts where they lack direct oversight over violating
transactions.203
Rather than managing risk with targeted countries and individuals
in order to comply with the U.S. sanctions, many U.S. and foreign banks
have terminated thousands of corresponding banking relationships across
various countries since the increase in the use of economic sanctions.204
Surveys by both the World Bank205 and the U.K. Financial Conduct
Authority206 found that banks would rather eliminate entire classes of

198. De-risking, THE U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, https://www.state.gov/de-risking/
[https://perma.cc/9RVY-BDB7] (last visited Sept. 26, 2020).
199. ROSENBERG ET AL., supra note 1, at 35.
200. Julie Copeland & Mirella DeRose, The Risks of De-Risking, PROGRAM ON CORP.
COMPLIANCE
AND
ENF’T
AT
THE
N.Y.U.
(Sept.
7,
2016),
https://wp.nyu.edu/compliance_enforcement/2016/09/07/the-risks-of-de-risking/
[https://perma.cc/NZZ2-99R6].
201. Id.
202. Hong Kong Autonomy Act, Pub. L. No. 116-149, § 5(a), 134 Stat. 663, 666 (2020),
https://www.congress.gov/bill/116th-congress/house-bill/7440/text [https://perma.cc/V4EHPV6K].
203. See Copeland & DeRose, supra note 200 (“[H]eightened enforcement actions
combined with stricter financial regulations and considerations of profitability are causing
large banks to avoid rather than assess actual financial risk by limiting or eliminating entire
classes of customers based on country and product line.”); see also ROSENBERG ET AL., supra
note 1, at 35.
204. ROSENBERG ET AL., supra note 1, at 35.
205. Copeland & DeRose, supra note 200 (citing Fact Finding Summary from De-risking
Surveys,
THE
WORLD
BANK
(Nov.
1,
2015),
https://documents.worldbank.org/en/publication/documentsreports/documentdetail/534371468197058296/fact-finding-summary-from-de-riskingsurveys [https://perma.cc/Y9H9-SJCG]).
206. Copeland & DeRose, supra note 200 (citing David Artingstall et al., Drivers and
Impacts of Derisking, FIN. CONDUCT AUTH. (Feb. 2016), https://www.fca.org.uk/yourfca/documents/research/drivers-impacts-of-derisking [https://perma.cc/M2VL-3DZ5]).
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customers from targeted countries than comply with stricter regulations
and heightened sanctions enforcement.207
The sanctions have
encouraged both U.S. companies and FFIs to avoid transacting with entire
bodies of people from sanctioned regions such as the Middle East, Latin
America, and Africa. 208 This approach could exclude many foreign
investors from the U.S. financial markets209 and eventually weaken the
dollar as the primary international exchange currency. 210
De-risking has not gone unnoticed by the U.S. government.211 Its
major concern is that de-risking reduces the force of sanctions to compel
behavior against a targeted country.212 Banks have considerable
influence over private actors and cross-border connections.213 With
limited access to foreign correspondent transactions, the U.S. government
loses transparency and authority over foreign financial networks.214
In 2014, the U.S. Treasury acknowledged the effects of
institutions terminating relationships to reduce their risk of penalties.215
In an attempt to deter financial institutions from “de-risking” and
emphasize the importance of global banking relationships, the Treasury
and the federal banking agencies issued a Joint Fact Sheet on Foreign
Correspondent Banking (“Joint Fact Sheet”). 216 This press release
outlined expectations, enforcement actions, and penalties under programs

207. Copeland & DeRose, supra note 200.
208. Thomas Baxter, Compliance – Some Thoughts About Reaching the Next Level, THE

FED.
RES.
BANK
OF
N.Y.
(Feb.
9,
2015),
https://www.newyorkfed.org/newsevents/speeches/2015/bax020915,
[https://perma.cc/C9P3-4LZF].
209. See Copeland & DeRose, supra note 200 (noting that funds may go “underground,”
out of financial institution’s oversight).
210. Baxter, supra note 208.
211. Copeland & DeRose, supra note 200 (referring to senior U.S. government members—
like David Cohen, former CIA Deputy Director and Treasury Under Secretary—who have
declared de-risking a top priority and policy concern).
212. ROSENBERG ET AL., supra note 1, at 35.
213. Id.
214. Id.; see also Joint Fact Sheet on Foreign Correspondent Banking: Approach to
BSA/AML and OFAC Sanctions Supervision and Enforcement, THE U.S. DEP’T OF THE
TREASURY AND FED. BANKING AGENCIES (Aug. 30, 2016), https://www.treasury.gov/presscenter/pressreleases/Documents/Foreign%20Correspondent%20Banking%20Fact%20Sheet.pdf
[https://perma.cc/U9C6-NH2Z].
215. See Copeland & DeRose, supra note 200 (referring to a speech by U.S. Treasury
Under Secretary for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence David Cohen who “addresses
concerns about de-risking was one of the Department of Treasury’s top policy objectives”).
216. THE U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY AND FED. BANKING AGENCIES, supra note 214.
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such as economic sanctions administered by the Treasury’s OFAC 217—
i.e., the entity enforcing HKAA.218 The Joint Fact Sheet emphasizes that
most financial institutions identified for penalties from continued
connection to a sanctioned individual usually correct the unlawful action
before penalties or enforcement occurs. 219 Additionally, the Joint Fact
Sheet emphasized that the penalties for violating OFAC sanctions
involved sustained patterns or major violations by financial institutions
and not unintentional mistakes or unintentional evasion of the
sanctions.220
2. De-risking Leading to Potential Decline in Dollar Dominance
Despite the government’s attempts to reduce de-risking, the U.S.
has continued to impose economic sanctions.221 Continued use of
targeted economic sanctions for U.S. foreign policy will further
encourage FFIs to de-risk to avoid the sanctions violation penalties and
harm to reputation.222 De-risking could gradually reduce the dollar as a
currency of choice. 223
Although a dramatic shift away from the U.S. as the key market
for investment and currency transactions is unlikely, responses to the
tension between the U.S. and China suggest investors and foreign banks
are gradually shifting away from complete dependence on the U.S. as a
financial center.224 For example, HSBC already removed a large portion
217. Id. (noting the federal banking agencies included FDIC NCUA, OCC, FRB).
218. Id.
219. See id. (“The vast majority (about 95%) of BSA/OFAC compliance deficiencies

identified . . .are corrected by the institution’s management without the needed for any
enforcement action or penalty.”).
220. Id.
221. Since 2016, the United States has continued to sanction numerous countries
individually and under groups of foreign policy sanctions programs. Sanctions Programs and
Country Information, THE U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, https://home.treasury.gov/policyissues/financial-sanctions/sanctions-programs-and-country-information
[https://perma.cc/U877-QNAG] (last retrieved Oct. 23, 2020) (listing multiple sanctions
programs since the issuance of the Joint Fact sheet on de-risking in 2016).
222. See ROSENBERG ET AL., supra note 1, at 35; Baxter, supra note 208 (“Even the size of
penalties for violations, and the potential reputational damage associated with this business,
it is very difficult to quarrel with the business judgment [of de-risking]”).
223. Copeland & DeRose, supra note 200.
224. Weizhen Tan, The Dollar May Slide Further, but Analysts Say its Demise is ‘Greatly
Exaggerated’, CNBC (Aug. 23, 2020, 7:43 PM), https://www.cnbc.com/2020/08/24/usdollar-still-unrivaled-as-global-reserve-currency-versus-yuan-euro.html
[https://perma.cc/3EP7-3FBZ].
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of its U.S. operations in early 2020, and analysts have commented that
the chance of HSBC keeping U.S. operations is more unlikely after the
passage of the HKAA.225 Further, the strength of the dollar has been
called into question by several investment analysts and strategists. 226
Blackrock strategists expect the dollar’s weakness to persist, making its
prominence uncertain in the long-term.227 However, other economists
consider the possibility of the dollar’s decline as overdramatized and that
the dollar’s status as the global currency is paramount to either the yuan
or euro.228
In light of recent trends in Chinese growth, a gradual shift away
from the dollar during this century should not be wholly dismissed,229
especially as the euro and yuan could balance out exchange reserves. 230
The Chinese government is expanding the scope of its capital markets to
allow for more foreign investors.231 U.S. companies and investment
funds continue to look towards China as a major growth opportunity,
even as the conflict between the two countries continues.232
225. Chad Bray & Enoch You, Does HSBC Need Its US Business? Bank Says Yes, Some
Investors Call for a Break-up, S. CHINA MORNING POST (Sept. 3, 2020, 7:30 AM),
https://www.scmp.com/business/banking-finance/article/3099942/does-hsbc-need-its-usbusiness-bank-says-yes-some [https://perma.cc/A3JW-54PH].
226. Tan, supra note 224.
227. Id.
228. Id.
229. Evelyn Cheng, Global Funds Invest More in China as Coronavirus Spreads to the
Rest
of
the
World,
CNBC
(May
13,
2020,
8:26
PM),
https://www.cnbc.com/2020/05/14/global-funds-invest-more-in-china-as-coronavirusspreads-to-the-world.html [https://perma.cc/X9LZ-YP2E] (“[E]ven at lower levels of growth,
going to be the dominant, the super majority driver of growth (over the) next 10 years.”).
230. See Saqib Iqbal Ahmed, U.S. Dollar’s Woes are Only Beginning, Some Bears Say,
THOMSON REUTERS (Sept. 15, 2020, 4:46 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/usa-marketsdollar-analysis-idUSKBN25S3KN [https://perma.cc/Z4TR-T96T]; see also Mark Gilbert &
Marcus Ashworth, A Currency War Is the Last Thing the World Needs, BLOOMBERG (Sept. 3,
2020, 1:00 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2020-09-03/euro-v-dollar-acurrency-war-is-the-last-thing-the-world-needs?sref=x6qPv4jT
[https://perma.cc/JC5LV8JE]; Frank Ting, Chinese Yuan to Become No. 3 Global Currency by 2030 after US Dollar,
Euro, Morgan Stanley Predicts, S. CHINA MORNING POST (Sept. 8, 2020, 9:00 AM),
https://www.scmp.com/economy/china-economy/article/3100575/chinese-yuan-become-no3-global-currency-2030-after-us-dollar [https://perma.cc/6H34-N24D].
231. Luoyan Liu & Meg Shen, China Expands Investment Scope for Foreign Investors
Under
Combined
Scheme,
THOMSON
REUTERS
(Sept.
25,
2020),
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-economy-investment/china-expands-investmentscope-for-foreign-investors-under-combined-scheme-idUSKCN26G1ZM
[https://perma.cc/T8BN-HDL4].
232. Andrew Browne, Bloomberg New Economy: Fund Managers Are Rushing Into China,
BLOOMBERG
(Sept.
12,
2020,
6:45
AM),
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/newsletters/2020-09-12/bloomberg-new-economy-fund-
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Additionally, the U.S. sanction-heavy strategy has encouraged
companies to safeguard against future sanctions by increasing
compliance efforts and attempting to avoid the U.S. financial system.233
One recent trend in terms of sanctions is the increased use of alternative
currency clauses to minimize risk in case a party becomes subject to U.S.
sanctions.234 China and Hong Kong’s institutions have also begun hiring
more regulatory and compliance lawyers in light of the U.S. sanctions
and Chinese security laws.235 The increase of compliance operations
could be a response to avoid U.S. sanctions and bypass the U.S. financial
system going forward, which could decrease the dollar’s dominance in
the long term.236 There is no question that the dollar dominates
international exchange markets.237 However, the dollar’s future as a key
foreign policy bargaining tool is not guaranteed if the U.S. uses economic
sanctions to coerce allies and separate them from China. 238
3. Long-Term Impact on U.S. Relationships with Allies and
Developing Countries
The use of U.S. sanctions and gradual de-risking from the U.S. as
the center of global capital markets can potentially impact other
international relationships with European countries and developing
managers-are-rushing-into-china?sref=uo8ONmoB [https://perma.cc/F5EL-MCDU]; see
also Cheng, supra note 229 (noting that investors are seeking to increase investments in
China, despite COVID-19 and trade war turmoil).
233. Jason Hungerford et al., Issues Arising for Financial Institutions and Regulated
Entities, GLOBAL INVESTIGATIONS REV.: THE GUIDE TO SANCTIONS, at 182 (2020),
https://www.mayerbrown.com/-/media/files/perspectives-events/publications/2020/09/11issues-arising-for-financial-institutions-and-regulated-entities_2.pdf [https://perma.cc/6E5AN9VG].
234. The “alternative currency clauses” designate foreign currency outside of USD to use
in anticipating possible sanctions from the U.S. government. See id. (“The purpose of
alternative currency clauses is usually to obviate U.S. primary sanctions risk in the event a
party or a transaction becomes subject to U.S. sanctions.”).
235. Alun John & Sumeet Chatterjee, Hong Kong Financial Firms Step Up Compliance
Hiring Amid U.S. Sanctions, Security Law, THOMSON REUTERS (Sept. 15, 2020, 4:55 PM),
https://www.reuters.com/article/hongkong-security-finance-idUSKBN25V068
[https://perma.cc/D9SL-2VHC].
236. John & Chatterjee, supra note 235; see also Baxter, supra note 208 (discussing how
the role of the U.S. dollar as “the international medium of exchange” can lead to different
compliance risks, which can lead “U.S. correspondent banks [] to ‘de-risk’”).
237. Tan, supra note 224.
238. See Rennemo, supra note 14 (discussing how the dollar currently dominates “88
percent of foreign exchange transactions . . . [however] the dollar’s position is not preordained”).
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countries.239 U.S. politicians have recognized these risks and expressed
concerns about the overuse of sanctions.240 Economic sanctions like the
HKAA are only successful when U.S. goals align with or are widely
accepted by foreign governments and institutions.241 However, now that
the sanctions target China, other countries are less willing to comply with
the U.S. and abandon efforts in China, as they consider the role of the
Chinese economy in their countries’ futures. 242
First, European allies have grown increasingly concerned over
the U.S.’ use of economic sanctions and “abusing its hegemonic
privileges.”243 In 2015, the “weaponization of finance” by the U.S. was
considered a top risk in politics and in foreign markets.244 Further, the
risks of a decoupling between the U.S. and China and the political
tensions between the two countries were ranked as two of the top five
geopolitical risks threatening the global economy in 2020.245 The
weaponization of global trade amplifies much of this tension.246 The risk
of the tensions between China and the U.S. not only threatens a $5 trillion
technology industry, but a great decoupling would force countries to
choose between a side on a “virtual Berlin Wall,” which risks creating a

239. See ROSENBERG ET AL., supra note 1, at 13 (“Political risk analysts have predicted that
this ‘weaponization of finance’ could trigger a politically motivated diversification away from
U.S. capital markets and the dollar.”).
240. Id.
241. Katzenstein, supra note 12, at 342.
242. Rennemo, supra note 14.
243. See ROSENBERG ET AL., supra note 1, at 13 (discussing how initiatives like BRICS—
a group of developing countries called upon by Vladimir Putin—have emerged in response to
the U.S.’s “weaponization of finance” and can lead other allies to question the U.S.’s misuse
of this financial power).
244. Eurasia Group Publishes Top Risks 2015, EURASIA GROUP (Jan. 5, 2015),
https://www.eurasiagroup.net/media/eurasia-group-publishes-top-risks-2015
[https://perma.cc/7BD7-FLNF] (“The weaponization of finance: To achieve foreign policy
goals without military might, Washington is weaponizing finance on a new scale. It is using
carrots (access to capital markets) and sticks (varied types of sanctions) as tools of coercive
diplomacy. But this strategy will damage relations with allies, particularly in Europe, and US
companies will find themselves caught in the crossfire between Washington and sanctioned
states.”).
245. Ian Bremmer & Cliff Kupchan, Top Risks 2020: Coronavirus Edition, EURASIA
GROUP
at
7
(Mar.
19,
2020),
https://www.eurasiagroup.net/files/upload/top_risks_2020_coronavirus_edition_1.pdf
[https://perma.cc/WN4A-RE9V].
246. Ian Bremmer & Cliff Kupchan, Risk 2: The Great Decoupling, EURASIA GROUP (Jan
6,
2020),
https://www.eurasiagroup.net/live-post/risk-2-great-decoupling
[https://perma.cc/6RJZ-N2BE].
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rigid divide in investments, financial services, and several other
industries.247
Ultimately, the use of targeted sanctions to weaponize the U.S.
capital market has grown to be seen as a form of “coercive diplomacy”
over the past several years.248 Forcing European countries to choose sides
will likely “damage relations with allies, particularly in Europe, and U.S.
companies will find themselves caught in the crossfire between
Washington and sanctioned states.”249 Effects of the U.S. attempting to
pressure European allies by using sanctions have already emerged as
European leaders have announced efforts to stand on their own against
China.250 Although European and Chinese trade relationships are equally
filled with feelings of distrust and tensions,251 Europe has taken strategic
steps to manage its position with China rather than take the U.S. approach
towards decoupling.252 Ultimately, Europe understands the need to
cooperate with China to achieve Europe’s economic goals253 and has not

247. Bremmer & Kupchan, supra note 246.
248. EURASIA GROUP, supra note 244; see also Rennemo, supra note 14 (discussing how

the U.S. dependence on sanctions is unhealthy and its use of sanctions against China is an
example of “coercive diplomacy”).
249. See EURASIA GROUP, supra note 244.
250. Echoing thoughts against relying on countries such as the United States in dealing
with China, Merkel claimed “we Europeans must really take fate into our own hands.” Dan
Baer, Europe and China’s ‘Virtual Summit’, CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INT’L PEACE (Sept.
17, 2020), https://carnegieendowment.org/2020/09/17/europe-and-china-s-virtual-summitpub-82750 [https://perma.cc/K2TF-79Q4]. Similar reactions have been expressed by the
French Minister of State for European Affairs, claiming “Europeans know that they must once
again speak the language of power, without losing sight of the grammar of cooperation.” Id.
251. Janka Oertel, The New China Consensus: How Europe is Growing Wary of Beijing,
EUROPEAN
COUNCIL
ON
FOREIGN
RELATIONS
(Sept.
7,
2020),
https://www.ecfr.eu/publications/summary/the_new_china_consensus_how_europe_is_gro
wing_wary_of_beijing [https://perma.cc/9NT9-3652].
252. Europe seeks to “diversify” from China rather than “decouple.” Andreas Kluth,
Opinion, Europe Just Declared Independence from China, BLOOMBERG (Sept. 5, 2020, 1:00
AM),
https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2020-09-05/europe-just-declaredindependence-from-china?sref=x6qPv4jT [https://perma.cc/B9VH-KSBL].
253. See Kluth, supra note 252 (discussing how some European countries like Germany
have not responded to the U.S. calls to “decouple” from China, especially since European
countries realize that “they must also seek Chinese cooperation wherever necessary to
solve global problems, from climate change to the next pandemic”); see also Joshua Mitnick,
Why the U.S. Can’t Get Israel to Break Up with China, FOREIGN POLICY (June 16, 2020),
https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/06/16/us-israel-china-deals/ [https://perma.cc/8QEY-TKHY]
(“Israel sees China as an opportunity.”).
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been pushed away from China through the U.S.’ use of trade tactics like
economic sanctions.254
Finally, the continued overuse of targeted economic sanctions
under policies like the HKAA could limit the U.S.’s bargaining power
with developing countries in the twenty-first century.255 This is
especially concerning as countries like China are beginning to become
immunized from potential impacts from sanctions,256 form coalitions
with other sanctioned countries,257 and invest in developing markets—for
example, China’s Belt and Road Initiative258—from which U.S. and
western banks have attempted to de-risk.259
Even if the U.S. does not target a developing country directly,
many emerging markets are affected indirectly—"becoming poorer and
more marginalized”260—as financial institutions withdraw from areas
seen as too risky to chance penalties for not complying with U.S.
254. Rennemo, supra note 14; see Andrew Michta, Can China Turn Europe Against
America, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 13, 2020, 12:16 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/can-chinaturn-europe-against-america-11600013768 [https://perma.cc/7X6Z-EKWW] (arguing that
China may be able to win Europe over because the U.S. “has not been able to convince
Europeans to see Beijing as anything more dangerous than an economic problem set”). Also
note that the U.S. has also had difficulty getting European Countries to support the imposition
of sanctions on other countries like Iran this year. Adam Payne, Mike Pompeo Accused
European Allies of ‘Siding with the Ayatollahs’ After They Refused to Back Trump on Iran,
BUS. INSIDER (Aug. 21, 2020, 7:00 AM), https://www.businessinsider.com/donald-trumpmike-pompeo-accuses-european-allies-iran-ayotollahs-2020-8
[https://perma.cc/95AAQRK9].
255. ROSENBERG ET AL., supra note 1, at 13.
256. ROSENBERG ET AL., supra note 1, at 36.
257. ROSENBERG ET AL., supra note 1, at 13 (“Russian president Vladimir Putin called upon
the other leaders from the BRICS [Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa] grouping of
developing economies to develop ‘a system of measures that would help prevent the
harassment of countries that do not agree with some foreign policy decisions made by the
U.S. and their allies.’”).
258. Andrew Chatzky & James McBride, China’s Massive Belt and Road Initiative,
COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS (Jan. 28, 2020), https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/chinasmassive-belt-and-road-initiative [https://perma.cc/T3HN-HKBG] (“For Xi, the [Belt and
Road Initiative] serves as pushback against the much-touted U.S. ‘pivot to Asia,’ as well as a
way for China to develop new investment opportunities, cultivate export markets, and boost
Chinese incomes and domestic consumption. ‘Under Xi, China now actively seeks to shape
international norms and institutions and forcefully asserts its presence on the global stage.’”).
259. THOMAS LUM ET AL., CONG. RES. SERV., R40361, CHINA’S FOREIGN AID ACTIVITIES IN
AFRICA,
LATIN
AMERICA,
AND
SOUTHEAST
ASIA
(Feb.
25,
2009),
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R40361.pdf [https://perma.cc/G7CT-Q96B]; Matt Ferchen, How
China is Reshaping International Development, CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INT’L PEACE
(Jan.
8,
2020),
https://carnegieendowment.org/2020/01/08/how-china-is-reshapinginternational-development-pub-80703 [https://perma.cc/6AZ8-93PL].
260. Copeland & DeRose, supra note 200.
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sanctions.261 In addition, the U.S. sanctions have the potential to impact
almost every non-western region, especially as its list of sanctioned
individuals grows.262 Simultaneously, China continues to finance and
strengthen international relations with countries that the U.S. has
historically shunned.263 Further, by continuing to target China through
policies such as the HKAA, China may interpret sanctions actions to
mean that the U.S. does not consider the Chinese economy to be on an
equal playing field, which ultimately could affect the U.S.’ bargaining
power in foreign policy and restrict access to China as it emerges as a
new center of the global economy.264
V. CONCLUSIONS
Ultimately, the threat to freedom of speech and civil liberties in
Hong Kong is concerning.265 However, the U.S. legislative and executive
branches’ quick and haphazard response to a geopolitical phenomenon
stemmed from the fear of an ideological position and did not consider the
long-term impacts on the U.S. financial sector in a globalized
economy.266 While the short-term impacts of the HKAA alone are still
emerging, the continued disconnect between U.S. legislators and
investors regarding foreign policy towards China could undermine the

261. Id.
262. See Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons List, OFF. OF FOREIGN

ASSETS CONTROL (Sept. 24, 2020), https://www.treasury.gov/ofac/downloads/sdnlist.pdf
[https://perma.cc/69FG-NLV9] (noting there are thousands of individuals on the SDN list
across multiple countries).
263. Between 2000 and 2014, the U.S. and China were almost equal in government
financing to other countries—including loans for infrastructure development and other
projects. China is estimated to have provided $354 billion and the U.S. at $370 billion; many
of the countries which China has funded have been deemed threats to the United States and
have been sanctioned by the United States in the past. McCullough, supra note 197.
264. McCullough, supra note 197 (quoting Samantha Custer, Director of AidData’s Policy
Analysis; “If we don’t create space for an emerging China to be at the table as an equal player,
then they will continue to work around prevailing international rules with limited
transparency”).
265. See SUSAN V. LAWRENCE AND MICHAEL F. MARTIN, CONG. RES. SERV., R46473,
CHINA’S NATIONAL SECURITY LAW FOR HONG KONG: ISSUES FOR CONGRESS 1 (2020)
(discussing the reasoning behind the United States’ concern regarding the HKSAR Security
Law and the threat to the freedom of speech in Hong Kong).
266. Regarding the “quick and haphazard response of the U.S. government,” See 116
CONG. REC. S4179 (daily ed. July 2, 2020) (statement of Sen. Boozman); see also ROSENBERG
ET AL., supra note 1, at 34 (discussing the role of financial institutions and potential impacts
to the U.S. economy as a result of the sanctions).
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U.S. position as a financial powerhouse in the twenty-first century.267
Thus, rather than relying on the U.S. markets and dollar as its bargaining
token, the U.S. should consider improving multilateral trade initiatives
and improving engagement with China before it self-isolates from some
of the most lucrative investments in the world.268
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267. See Rennemo, supra note 14 (regarding using sanctions and coercive diplomacy, the
U.S. risks high political costs, losing allies, and economic risks when taking on China).
268. See Woetzel et al., supra note 16, at 132 (“More engagement with China could offer
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by gaining access to China’s large user base and vast digital ecosystem, both of which are
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